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Liability Insurance and Gun Violence
PETER KOCHENBURGER
Gun violence and mass shootings have dominated headlines during the
last several years. These tragedies, including the Sandy Hook Elementary
School shooting, received national and international attention and
prompted new demands to address gun violence in the United States.
Among the many proposals advanced by the media, advocacy groups,
legislators, and academics is mandating liability insurance for all gun
owners. Proponents point to insurance’s risk assessment and mitigation
functions as providing financial incentives and penalties to encourage
policyholders to purchase, store, and use firearms in the safest manner
possible, with explicit analogies to mandatory auto insurance, and
insurance generally, where prudent behavior results in lower premiums
and the riskier pay more. Numerous legislative proposals were put forth in
2013; none passed.
This Article’s purpose is to provide a more in-depth scrutiny than has
been previously presented on the merits of mandating liability insurance
for gun owners. My perspective is through the lens of liability insurance
and regulation, and this Article thereby reviews the major issues
associated with such proposals—including the likelihood that many
defendants in gun-related claims will not carry insurance even if required
by law. I conclude that, despite the obvious enforcement problems,
insurance’s ability to address and reduce gun violence is a potentially
valuable tool. We do not have enough research and information to dismiss
its use based on often ill-supported assumptions about what insurance
“should” do and how consumers, insurers, and regulators would react to a
liability insurance mandate.
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Liability Insurance and Gun Violence
PETER KOCHENBURGER*
I. INTRODUCTION
On December 14, 2012, Adam Lanza entered Sandy Hook Elementary
School in Newtown, Connecticut, and murdered twenty children and six
adults.1 This mass shooting, the worst grade school rampage in U.S.
history, reignited the gun control debate and led to immediate calls for
stricter control laws and equally vocal, if less numerous, demands for
providing armed guards or police in schools as well as arming teachers.2
Within four months, Connecticut passed one of the most comprehensive
gun control laws in the country, the reverberations of which continued well
past the end of the legislative session in June 2013.3
Throughout 2013, the popular media and insurance-related press also
discussed using insurance as a potential tool to manage many of the threats

*

Associate Clinical Professor of Law and Executive Director, Insurance Law Center, University
of Connecticut School of Law. I would like to thank Professors George Mocsary, Patricia McCoy,
Sachin Pandya, and Peter Siegelman, Insurance Law Librarian Yan Hong, and David Snyder. Research
assistants Chad Vincente, Connor McNamara, and Tashika Russell provided invaluable help.
1
The New York Times and the Hartford Courant have extensive online material about this
tragedy and its aftermath. Times Topics: Newtown, Conn., School Shootings (Adam Lanza), N.Y.
TIMES, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/s/school_shootings/index.html (last
visited Apr. 15, 2014); Tragedy in Newtown: Continuing Coverage, HARTFORD COURANT,
http://www.courant.com/news/connecticut/newtown-sandy-hook-school-shooting/ (last visited Apr. 15,
2014). In November 2013, the Office of the State’s Attorney for Danbury, Connecticut—which was
responsible for criminal prosecutions in Newtown—issued its report. STEPHEN J. SEDENSKY III,
REPORT OF THE STATE’S ATTORNEY FOR THE JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF DANBURY ON THE SHOOTINGS AT
SANDY HOOK ELEMENTARY SCHOOL AND 36 YOGANANDA STREET, NEWTOWN, CONNECTICUT ON
DECEMBER 24, 2012 (2013), available at http://www.ct.gov/csao/lib/csao/Sandy_Hook_Final_Report.p
df. In December 2013, the Connecticut State Police released much more extensive reports and related
multimedia files. Sandy Hook Elementary School Shooting Reports, CONN. DEPARTMENT EMERGENCY
SERVS. & PUB. PROTECTION, http://cspsandyhookreport.ct.gov (last visited Apr. 15, 2014).
2
E.g., Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Report Sees Guns as Path to Safety in Schools, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3,
2013, at A18; Associated Press, Connecticut Community Approves Armed Guards for Schools, NEW
HAVEN REG. (Mar. 27, 2013), http://www.nhregister.com/general-news/20130327/connecticutcommunity-approves-armed-guards-for-schools; Wayne LaPierre, Making Our Nation’s School
Children Safer, NRA-ILA INST. FOR LEGIS. ACTION (June 1, 2013), http://www.nraila.org/newsissues/articles/2013/6/making-our-nations-school-children-safer.aspx.
3
“An Act Concerning Gun Violence Prevention and Children’s Safety” was signed into law on
April 4, 2013. 2013 Conn. Acts 47 (Reg. Sess.). Various provisions of the Act were challenged on
Constitutional grounds; a federal district court upheld the law in January 2014. Shew v. Malloy, 994 F.
Supp. 2d 234, 239 (D. Conn. 2014).
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or harms that firearms and gun ownership can cause. By February 2013,
insurance requirements for gun ownership were introduced in at least seven
states and the District of Columbia, but did not survive in any of them.5
This is not surprising, as only a small percentage of bills ever emerge from
any legislature,6 and the legislation linking gun ownership to insurance was
usually either vague or likely unworkable on its face.7 However, while
these efforts were easy to criticize—and for some to ridicule—their origin
lay in a long-accepted recognition that liability insurance often plays an
important role in regulating potentially dangerous products.
4
E.g., Rick Green, Time Is Ripe to Consider Liability Insurance for Gun Owners, HARTFORD
COURANT (Jan. 21, 2013), http://articles.courant.com/2013-01-21/news/hc-green-gun-liabilitynewtown-20130121_1_gun-owners-liability-insurance-gun-safety; John Stoehr, Changing the Rhetoric
from Gun Control to Gun Insurance, GLOBALPOST.COM (Jan. 18, 2013, 4:16 PM),
http://www.globalpost.com/dispatches/globalpost-blogs/commentary/gun-control-gun-insurance-NRA;
John Wasik, Newtown’s New Reality: Using Liability Insurance to Reduce Gun Deaths, FORBES (Dec.
17, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/johnwasik/2012/12/17/newtowns-new-reality-using-liabilityinsurance-to-reduce-gun-deaths/; see also Michael Cooper & Mary Williams Walsh, Buying a Gun?
States Consider Insurance Rule, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2013, at A1 (discussing state proposals to
mandate liability insurance for gun owners); Brian MacQuarrie, Warren Joins Menino Push for
Tougher Gun Control Laws, BOS. GLOBE, Jan. 19, 2013, at B3 (discussing legislative support for a
Massachusetts bill that would require liability insurance); Elizabeth Bunn, U.S. Insurers Resist Push to
Make Gun Owners Get Coverage, BLOOMBERG.COM (Feb. 19, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news
/2013-02-19/u-s-insurers-resist-push-to-make-gun-owners-get-coverage.html
(detailing
insurers’
opposition to liability insurance proposals); Bonnie Cavanaugh, Insurance Industry Closely Watches
Proposed Firearms Liability Laws, PROP. CASUALTY 360 (Apr. 12, 2013), http://www.propertycasualt
y360.com/2013/04/12/insurance-industry-closely-watches-proposed-firear (discussing the insurance
industry’s perspectives on proposed liability insurance mandates). The three hour legislative
subcommittee public hearing on Connecticut’s bill to mandate liability insurance for gun owners on
March 13, 2013, is demonstrative of the hostilities toward such proposals. Insurance & Real Estate
Committee, CONN. NETWORK (Mar. 19, 2013), http://ct-n.com/ondemand.asp?ID=8809. The bill died
immediately after the hearing.
5
H.B. 6656, Gen. Assemb., Jan. Sess. (Conn. 2013); B. 20-0170, 2013 Council, Reg. Sess. (D.C.
2013); H.B. 1155 amend. 20, 98th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2013); S.B. 577, 2013 Gen. Assemb.,
Reg. Sess. (Md. 2013); H.B. 3253, 188th Gen. Court, Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2013); Assemb. B. 3908,
2013–2014 Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2013); H.B. 521, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2013). For a
discussion of the proposal for an insurance requirement in California, see infra note 7. Bills cited in
this Article may have been subsequently amended or removed entirely from a state’s legislative
calendar.
6
See Karen Suhaka, Comparing State Legislatures by Counting Bills, BILLTRACK50.COM,
https://www.billtrack50.com/blog/election/comparing-state-legislatures-by-counting-bills/ (last visited
Apr. 15, 2014) (suggesting that a number of states have bill success rates as low as ten percent, with
even the most successful states being around fifty percent).
7
See, e.g., Assemb. B. 3908 (“Any person in this State who shall own a firearm shall . . .
obtain. . . a policy of liability insurance in an amount not less than two hundred and fifty thousand
dollars specifically covering any damage resulting from any negligent acts involving the use of such
firearm while it is owned by such person.” (emphases added)). When introduced in February 2013,
California Assembly Bill 231 contained a liability insurance requirement, Don Thompson, California
Bill Would Force Gun Owners to Buy Insurance, INS. J. (Feb. 7, 2013),
http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/west/2013/02/07/280464.htm, but the requirement was dropped
long before a modified version of the bill passed in the fall, Assemb. B. 231, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess.
(Cal. 2103).
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Liability insurance protects the financial assets of policyholders
engaged in socially useful activities (e.g., home ownership, driving
vehicles, undertaking a profession, running a business); provides a source
of compensation to injured claimants; encourages the design and use of
safer products; and serves as a private regulator as insurers assess, accept
or reject, and price risk for individual policyholders.8 Liability insurance
theoretically could provide similar benefits to private gun ownership.
However, there are three major obstacles: two are surmountable, though
politically difficult, and one is more intractable.9 First, if most firearm
injuries are intentionally caused and result from illegal actions, then the
standard liability policy excludes coverage for the policyholder. Second,
there is a weak—or nonexistent—correlation between the safety incentives
that liability insurers could encourage and their coverage obligations under
their insurance policies. Third, even if states required insurers to provide
liability coverage for intentional harm caused by firearms, and likewise
required gun owners to purchase it, some individuals would not comply.
This Article’s purpose is to contribute to the ongoing public policy
debate on insurance and gun violence. It links legislative proposals that
require liability insurance for gun owners to existing insurance policy
language, explains the practical consequences of how seemingly minimal
changes in wording can affect coverage, and describes how insurers are
already narrowing liability coverage for intentionally caused harm, with
important consequences for insuring firearm use. Many opponents of
mandatory firearm insurance have overstated their case and this Article
suggests how, despite the difficulties described, states could fashion an
insurance framework to cover firearm violence.
This Article
acknowledges significant limitations to any proposal to mandate and
enforce compulsory liability insurance for gun owners, but argues it is too
soon to dismiss the many potential advantages of such a liability insurance
system for significantly reducing gun violence.
This Article reviews approximately twenty different policy forms from
the largest personal lines writers in the country to document the
diminishing coverage for intentional harm and negligence claims
surrounding intentional acts. Rather than use the standard methodology of
focusing largely on differences in case law related to insuring intentional
harm, this approach more accurately captures the state of the insurance
8
See Tom Baker & Rick Swedloff, Regulation by Liability Insurance: From Auto to Lawyers
Professional Liability, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1412, 1416–23 (2013) (discussing the ways in which liability
insurance influences moral behavior). See generally RICHARD V. ERICSON ET AL., INSURANCE AS
GOVERNANCE (2003) (explaining the regulatory roles of insurance).
9
This Article does not address Second Amendment concerns, which are important considerations
in any proposal to mandate liability insurance. This issue is reviewed briefly in another article
published within this Symposium Issue, George Mocsary, Insuring Against Guns?, 46 CONN. L. REV.
1209, Part III.B.5 (2014). Professor Mocsary is a leading Second Amendment scholar.
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market, and thus (typically) the state of available insurance coverage.
While case law obviously is important, it is derivative of the actual
intentional harm exclusions in insurance policies and does not reflect the
marketplace reduction in coverage for intentional harm; there is often a
significant time lag between the policy language scrutinized by courts and
commentators and the language many insurers currently utilize.10
II. LIABILITY INSURANCE AND GUN VIOLENCE11
A. Benefits of Liability Insurance
There is a long and often favorable story to tell of how insurance has
enhanced public safety. Just as insurers helped to encourage safer
automobiles,12 they may likewise be able to enhance gun safety by funding
research, utilizing data collected through their underwriting and claim
handling processes, supporting public information campaigns, and
lobbying legislatures and government agencies.13 Even more important is
insurers’ potential “gatekeeping function” in denying coverage to high-risk
individuals,14 as well as their ability to adjust premiums based on the
mitigating effects of owning a less risky type of firearm, utilizing gun
safety devices, storage requirements, and enrollment in firearm safety
courses.15
10
Too little attention is paid to insurance policy language in this area, as well as the ability of
state regulators and legislators to regulate policy terms. See infra Part II.C.1.
11
For purposes of this Article, “violence” means injuries and deaths involving a firearm,
including suicides.
12
The Insurance Institute for Highway Safety, which was founded in 1959 by three insurance
associations, focuses on crash safety research and advocacy. About the Institutes, INS. INST. FOR
HIGHWAY SAFETY & HIGHWAY LOSS DATA INST., http://www.iihs.org/iihs/about-us (last visited Apr.
15, 2014). Not all commentators agree with this sanguine view of insurer participation in auto safety;
Professor Mocsary’s article references this debate. Mocsary, supra note 9, Part V.A.
13
Cf. Omri Ben-Shahar & Kyle D. Logue, Outsourcing Regulation: How Insurance Reduces
Moral Hazard, 111 MICH. L. REV. 197, 210, 212, 219, 224 (2012) (providing examples of insurers
funding research facilities to study effective construction techniques, collecting “information
concerning the circumstances that gave rise to [a workplace] injury,” educating insureds about how to
reduce risk, and lobbying for air bags).
14
For a brief summary of insurers’ gatekeeping function, see Tom Baker & Thomas O. Farrish,
Liability Insurance and the Regulation of Firearms, in SUING THE GUN INDUSTRY 294–95 (Timothy D.
Lytton ed., 2005). An insurance mandate could place insurers in the position of determining whether
an individual can lawfully own a gun, creating delicate Second Amendment issues. Mocsary, supra
note 9, Part III.B.5.
15
See Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 13, at 205–08 (discussing the ability of insurers to adjust
their premiums based on the severity of the risk of the insured’s activity); see also District of Columbia
v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 627 (2008) (acknowledging that not all weapons are equal and some have less
justification for public use than others); Jennifer Bonnett & Wes Bowers, How Newtown Changed Us,
LODI NEWS-SENTINEL (Dec. 14, 2013), http://www.lodinews.com/news/article_d6ce3ad0-9049-5071b291-a3a47c2fe432.html (discussing how one California school district acknowledged that education
courses about different types of guns and mechanisms can help law enforcement and reduce liability
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Indeed, encouraging or mandating liability insurance to cover more
firearms-related injuries would shift some of the costs associated with this
harm to property casualty insurers, thereby creating greater financial
incentives for them to utilize their expertise in classifying and spreading
risk, promoting gun safety, and engaging in other risk mitigation strategies.
Within the insurance world, health, life, and disability insurers currently
bear the financial costs of firearm violence,16 at least to the extent that
victims have such insurance coverage.17 Property casualty insurers have
minimal exposure now, as many tortfeasors injuring others with firearms
may not have homeowners or renters insurance and, as discussed below,
specific provisions in their liability policies are likely to exclude coverage
for those that do.18
Insurers’ loss prevention and risk classification roles would be
similarly limited under their first party property coverages, as the major
risks and harm associated with careless storage of a firearm—serious
injury or death—are not related to physical damage to insured property, at
least not in any meaningful sense. For example, a homeowners insurer
might provide premium credits for smoke detectors and other safety
devices in a home because, should a related loss occur, its policies would
likely pay for much of the damage. In contrast, while incentives for
utilizing certain types of gunlocks or storage methods could reduce
suicides and homicides, when they do occur, the insurer’s policy would
likely not be triggered and the insurer would not be obligated to pay claims
arising out these actions.
Another major purpose of liability insurance is to provide a source of
compensation to injured parties.19 Naturally then, some advocates
maintain that liability insurance could play a similar, socially valuable role
for victims of gun violence, pointing to, for example, requirements in
virtually every state that automobile owners carry a minimum amount of
liability insurance.20 Liability insurance is frequently required by law in
due to gun violence). The ability and need to collect this data is also what worries some opponents of
mandatory insurance requirements for gun owners.
16
These costs associated with firearm violence may translate into increased premiums. See Jean
Lemaire, The Cost of Firearm Deaths in the United States: Reduced Life Expectancies and Increased
Insurance Costs, 72 J. RISK & INS. 359, 363, 369–71 (2005) (indicating that an “increased cost of
essential insurance policies” results from firearm violence and specifically analyzing the relationship
between life insurance costs and firearm deaths).
17
See EMBRY M. HOWELL & PETER ABRAHAM, URBAN INST., THE HOSPITAL COSTS OF FIREARM
ASSAULTS 2 (2013) (“Victims of firearm assault are disproportionately more likely to be uninsured.”).
18
See supra Part II.C.
19
KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE LIABILITY CENTURY 77–80 (2008).
20
Michael Cooper & Mary Williams Walsh, Buying a Gun? States Consider Insurance Rule,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2013, at A1; Ian Simpson, Gun Liability Insurance Could Be Mandatory for
Firearms Owners Under New State Proposals, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 6, 2013),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/02/06/gun-liability-insurance_n_2632321.html; see also State-by-
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other contexts as well, including professional liability (e.g., medical
malpractice),21 use of dangerous products (e.g., hazardous waste),22 and
residential facilities (e.g., nursing homes or child care facilities).23
Critics of these legislative proposals argue that liability insurance can
only cover negligent conduct and not intentional acts: “Property and
casualty insurance does not and cannot cover gun crimes.”24 This is a
crucial issue, because if proponents of such legislative proposals believe
liability insurance can help compensate gun victims and promote firearm
safety, then it must do so either within the existing negligence-based
framework of traditional liability insurance or within a new type of
coverage. Neither option is easy.
The usefulness of mandating liability insurance depends in part on how
many victims could benefit. Here, proponents have a major obstacle
because the vast majority of gun deaths in the United States result from
suicide or homicide.25 In 2010, for example, the Centers for Disease
State Minimum Coverage Requirements, AM. INST. CPAS, http://www.360financialliteracy.org/Topics/
Insurance/Cars-and-Auto-Insurance/State-by-State-Minimum-Coverage-Requirements (last visited
Apr. 15, 2014) (indicating that every state has “laws that either explicitly or in effect require you to
purchase at least some auto insurance” and describing the minimum coverage required in each state).
21
E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 20-11b (2013).
22
E.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 13-22-2-3 (LexisNexis 2011).
23
E.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 404.3 (West 2013) (child care facilities); VA CODE ANN. §
32.1-127 (2013) (nursing homes).
24
Bunn, supra note 4 (quoting the American Insurance Association) (internal quotation marks
omitted). The American Insurance Association is a leading property casualty trade association, which
“represents approximately 300 insurers that write more than $117 billion in premiums each year.” Id.
25
Obtaining accurate information on the number and causes of non-fatal gun injuries is difficult.
In 1996, Congress cut CDC funding for much of its gun-related mortality and injury research. Walter
Hickey, How the NRA Killed Federal Funding for Gun Violence Research, BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 16,
2013), http://www.businessinsider.com/cdc-nra-kills-gun-violence-research-2013-1. Only recently has
the CDC been permitted to continue a portion of its work in this area. Id.; see Sydney Lupkin, CDC
Ban on Gun Research Caused Lasting Damage, ABC NEWS (Apr. 9, 2013), http://abcnews.go.com/He
alth/cdc-ban-gun-research-caused-lasting-damage/story?id=18909347 (“President Obama may have
ended the 17-year ban on gun violence research at the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,
but even if Congress restores research funds, experts say the damage runs deeper than funding cuts.”).
Moreover, gun control advocates and opponents hotly debate demographic definitions and how
firearm injury causes are classified. Compare Michael Luo & Mike McIntire, Children and Guns: The
Hidden Toll, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2013, at A1 (indicating that a “review of hundreds of child firearm
deaths found that accidental shootings occurred roughly twice as often as the records indicate, because
of idiosyncrasies in how such deaths are classified by the authorities,” resulting in “scores of accidental
killings . . . not reflected in the official statistics that have framed the debate over how to protect
children from guns”), with Dave Kopel, How Your Tax Dollars Demonize Your Guns,
NRA MEDIA, http://www.nrapublications.org/index.php/9485/how-your-tax-dollars-demonize-yourguns/ (last visited Apr. 15, 2014) (arguing that a study funded by the National Institutes of Health
concluding that “gun ownership . . . correlates with more gun violence” was flawed, in part due to an
inaccurate categorization of what constitutes “‘possessing’ a gun” and a failure to “measure gun
ownership accurately”), and CDC Data Refutes New Anti-Gun Study’s Claims, NRA-ILA INST. FOR
LEGIS. ACTION (Nov. 1, 2013), http://www.nraila.org/news-issues/articles/2013/11/cdc-data-refutesnew-anti-gun-studys-claims.aspx (noting the position of gun control opponents that “[f]irearm-related
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Control (CDC) reported that out of 31,672 firearm deaths, 61.2% were due
to suicide, 35% were caused by assault or homicide,26 and only 1.9%
resulted from “accidental discharge of firearms.”27 This breakdown is
relatively consistent over the years, as indicated by the table below
containing CDC data from 2008 to 2011:
TABLE 128
Deaths
Caused by
Firearms
Accidental
discharge of
firearms
Suicide by
firearm
Assault
(homicide) by
firearm
Undetermined
intent
Total

2008

Number
2009
2010

2011

2008

592

554

851

1.9%

1.8%

1.9%

2.6%

18,223

18,735

19,392

19,766

57.7%

59.8%

61.2%

61.5%

12,179

11,493

11,078

11,101

38.5%

36.7%

35.0%

34.5%

273

232

222

0.9%

0.7%

0.8%

0.7%

31,593

31,347

32,163

100%

100%

100%

100%

606

252
31,672

Percent of total
2009
2010

2011

deaths among children have decreased since the mid-1990s,” and questioning gun control advocates’
assertion that firearm-related deaths among children have “spiked 60% in a decade” in light of a
“mistake” in an underlying Centers for Disease Control study where there was a failure “to stipulate
what ages [were] include[d] in its definition of ‘children’”).
26
Sherry L. Murphy et al., Deaths: Final Data for 2010, 61 NAT’L VITAL STAT. REP., no. 4,
2013, at 1, 11, available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr61/nvsr61_04.pdf.
27
See id. at 40 tbl.10 (reporting that 606 deaths resulted from “[a]ccidental discharge of
firearms”). The remaining 0.8% was classified as “undetermined intent.” See id. at 41 tbl.10 (citing
the CDC’s National Vital Statistics Report, which stated that 252 out of 31,328 total “[d]eaths caused
by firearms” in 2010 were a result of “[u]ndetermined intent”). Firearm deaths are an imperfect proxy
for understanding the causes and results of gun violence. However, the insurance issues discussed in
this Article generally apply equally to gun violence resulting in non-fatal injuries as well as deaths.
The Firearm and Injury Center at the University of Pennsylvania Health System analyzed firearm
injuries and deaths and broke them down by a variety of factors, including age and ethnicity. FIREARM
& INJURY CTR. AT PENN, FIREARM INJURY IN THE U.S. (2011) [hereinafter PENN FIREARM STUDY],
available at http://www.uphs.upenn.edu/ficap/resourcebook/pdf/monograph.pdf.
28
Donna L. Hoyert & Jiaquan Xu, Deaths: Preliminary Data for 2011, 61 NAT’L
VITAL
STAT.
REP.,
no.
6,
2012,
at
1,
18–19
tbl.2,
available
at
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr61/nvsr61_06.pdf; Kenneth D. Kochanek et al., Deaths: Final
Data for 2009, 60 NAT’L VITAL STAT. REP., no. 3, 2011, at 1, 39–40 tbl.10, available at
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr60/nvsr60_03.pdf; Arialdi M. Miniño et al., Deaths: Final Data
for 2008, 59 NAT’L VITAL STAT. REP., no. 10, 2011, at 1, 36–37 tbl.10, available at
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr59/nvsr59_10.pdf; Murphy et al., supra note 26, at 40–41
tbl.10.
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Yet, for the reasons discussed in Part II.C, “accidental discharge” is the
only firearm-related cause of death or injury that liability insurance would
likely cover—at least as written under the current negligence-based
framework.
B. Reducing Gun Use in Suicides
As noted above in Table 1, suicides account for roughly sixty percent
of gun deaths. While the exact link between gun ownership and the
propensity to attempt suicide may still be disputed,29 it is clear that
individuals attempting suicide by using a gun are far more likely to
succeed than those attempting suicide by any other means.30 The fatality
rate for gun-related suicide attempts is reportedly between seventy and
ninety percent, in comparison to between ten and fifteen percent by other
means.31 Insurance’s private regulatory or safety enhancing roles could
help reduce this rate, particularly in preventing or delaying gun access to
those never intended to use them (e.g., children and teenagers). Public
health experts stress that since many suicide attempts are impulsive acts,
delaying access to a lethal weapon for even a brief period of time will
reduce suicide rates, as the suicidal impulses fade when the acute phase of
a crisis passes.32 Risk-based premiums, or the refusal to insure at all, could
be linked to storage requirements, trigger lock mechanisms, smart guns, or
similar technologies that could impede someone’s immediate ability to use
a gun.33
Unfortunately though, as with intentional shootings, there is not a
discernable link between the coverages afforded by a liability (or property)
insurance policy and suicides. This returns us to the initial problem: a
29
Compare Matthew Miller et al., Suicide Mortality in the United States: The Importance of
Attending to Method in Understanding Population-Level Disparities in the Burden of Suicide, 33 ANN.
REV. PUB. HEALTH 393, 401 (2012) (asserting that the risk of suicide in homes with a firearm is
“typically 2–10 times that of homes without firearms, depending on the sample population . . . and on
the way in which the firearms are stored”), with Don B. Kates & Gary Mauser, Would Banning
Firearms Reduce Murder and Suicide?, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 649, 690–93 (2007) (observing
“no relationship between the extent of suicide and the extent of gun ownership”).
30
See Sabrina Tavernise, With Guns, Killer and Victim Are Usually Same, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14,
2013, at A1 (stating that “[s]uicidal acts with guns are fatal in 85 percent of the cases, while those with
pills are fatal in just 2 percent of cases,” and adding that “[t]he chances of dying rise drastically when a
gun is present, because guns are so much more likely to be lethal”).
31
PENN FIREARM STUDY, supra note 27, at 22.
32
See, e.g., Miller et al., supra note 29, at 401–03 (stating that the availability of “highly lethal”
weapons can play a dominant role in suicide rates).
33
These safety mechanisms carry the disadvantage of making it more difficult for a person to use
a gun in self-defense. While not referencing insurance, the Penn Firearm Study discusses the value of
safety devices that “reduce unintended discharge” or use: “Making firearms safer would reduce injuries
from unintentional use and possibly from criminal use. The processes for stimulating such changes in
design can include market forces and litigation, consumer education, product oversight, and
regulation.” PENN FIREARM STUDY, supra note 27, at 38–39.

2014]

LIABILITY INSURANCE AND GUN VIOLENCE

1275

suicide would rarely trigger the decedent’s and his family’s liability
insurance policy, regardless of whether a firearm was stored in the safest
manner possible,34 and therefore the policy has no role in compensating
victims of a suicide, such as family and friends left behind. This
disconnect between an insurer’s financial responsibility under its policy
and the actions we seek to minimize—suicide attempts, and gun violence
more generally—makes it difficult to see why the insurance industry would
bring its money and influence to support this campaign.35
C. Liability Insurance and Intentional Harm
Since liability policies typically cover most negligent acts resulting in
bodily injury unless specifically excluded,36 claims arising out of a (truly)
negligent use of a firearm are already covered. However, CDC reports
show that firearm deaths resulting from accidental discharges of firearms
were about two percent of the total gun deaths reported from 2008 to
2010.37 In contrast, gun deaths classified as an assault or homicide during
this period constituted about thirty-five to thirty-nine percent of all firearmrelated deaths.38 The CDC defines “homicide” as used in its reports as
“injuries inflicted by another person with intent to injure or kill, by any
means.”39

34
I am not considering instances where a visitor in a home utilizes a policyholder’s gun to
commit suicide and the visitor’s estate sues the homeowners for allowing access to the firearm.
35
Insurers might contribute as part of a public service or charitable campaign, but this would
likely be much less of a commitment than if they were compensating insured losses. One major
insurer, however, believes the industry can do more in enhancing gun safety. Shortly after the
Newtown tragedy, General Re’s CEO, Franklin Montross, wrote in a column:

I think the insurance industry can play an important role in both the education and
the enhancement of gun safety . . . . The insurance industry can’t change the number
of guns in existence. We can influence how they are stored and encourage training
so they are used safely. Tackling this issue should benefit society and reinforce the
insurance industry’s commitment to risk engineering and risk mitigation.
ARTICLE FROM THE CHAIRMAN: GUN SAFETY, GEN. REINSURANCE CORP. (2013),
http://media.genre.com/documents/GunSafety201301-en.pdf. Mr. Montross did not reference liability
insurance. Id.
36
None of the homeowners policies I reviewed contained a firearm exclusion. Firearm exclusions
are occasionally found in commercial general liability policies, either in the body of the policy or as an
endorsement, and have been upheld by courts. E.g., Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Purdie, 193 Cal. Rptr.
248, 253–54, 256 (Ct. App. 1983); Capitol Specialty Ins. Corp. v. JBC Entm’t Holdings, Inc., 289 P.3d
735, 737–39 (Wash. Ct. App. 2012).
37
See supra Table 1.
38
See supra Table 1.
39
Definitions for WISQARSTM Fatal, CDC, http://www.cdc.gov/ncipc/wisqars/fatal/help/definition
s.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2014). This definition “[e]xcludes injuries due to legal intervention and
operations of war. Justifiable homicide is not identified in WISQARS.” Id. The CDC’s definition
varies from that used by some state or local medical examiners which may classify as a “homicide” any
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Liability insurance policies exclude homicides, as defined by the CDC,
and intentional assaults through several policy provisions that will be
addressed in Subsection 1 below. If a liability insurer successfully asserts
such defenses, then the insurance policy would not serve as a source of
compensation. Thus, for liability insurance to be an important tool or
method to compensate gun violence victims, or to enhance gun safety,
coverage for intentional harm caused by a firearm would seem to be
necessary.
Insurers argue, with justification, that an insurable event should be
“fortuitous,” an “accident,” and not intentionally caused by the
policyholder, lest insurers and society bear the moral hazard of allowing an
insured to financially benefit40 from a destructive or harmful act of their
own volition.41 Insuring such actions would (so the argument goes)
increase the amount of harmful and illegal conduct as well as cause
insurance premiums to increase for all policyholders.42
1. The “Occurrence” and Intentional Harm Provisions
Liability insurers primarily guard against covering intentional harm
through two policy provisions: (1) the requirement that there be an
“occurrence”; and (2) and the intentional harm exclusion.43 The policy
definition of an “occurrence” is largely consistent throughout the industry.
For example, the standard ISO44 homeowners form covers “bodily injury
shooting death caused by another, regardless of intent. These reporting discrepancies may distort
firearm death and injury statistics. Luo & McIntire, supra note 25.
40
The benefit in a liability policy is typically the payment of defense costs and
settlement/indemnity amounts for which the insured would otherwise be responsible.
41
ABRAHAM, supra note 19, at 14–17; 1 WILLARD PHILLIPS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
INSURANCE 608 (William S. Hein & Co. 4th ed., reprint 2006) (1854); WILLIAM R. VANCE,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF INSURANCE 64–65 (W. Publ’g Co. 2d ed., 1930); EMMETT J. VAUGHAN &
THERESE M. VAUGHAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF RISK AND INSURANCE 517 (10th ed. 2008).
42
ABRAHAM, supra note 19, at 14–17. But see Sinclair Oil Co. v. Columbia Cas. Co., 682 P.2d
975, 981 (Wyo. 1984) (“We know of no studies, statistics or proofs which indicate that contracts of
insurance to protect against liability for punitive damages have a tendency to make willful or wanton
misconduct more probable, nor do we know of any substantial relationship between the insurance
coverage and such misconduct.”). I discuss this issue in Section III.C.1.
43
This exclusion is often referred to as the “intentional acts” exclusion. This term is misleading,
as usually it is intentionally caused harm or damage that triggers the exclusion, and not whether the act
leading up to the harm was deliberate.
44
ISO, formerly the Insurance Services Office, performs a variety of services for insurers,
including serving as a statistical agent, collecting and correlating claim information to specific policy
coverage, and drafting policy language (forms) and seeking approval from state regulators for their use.
Overview of ISO Products and Services, ISO, http://www.iso.com/Products/Overview-of-ISOProducts-and-Services/Overview-of-ISO-Products-and-Services.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2014).
While many of the larger insurers draft and submit their own forms, they often draw heavily from ISO
language. ISO drafted language is utilized extensively for personal lines policies, as well as
commercial general liability and commercial auto lines. ISO’s Policy Language and Rules, ISO,
http://www.iso.com/Products/Overview-of-ISO-Products-and-Services/ISO-s-Policy-Language-andRules.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2014).
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and property damage caused by an ‘occurrence,’” which is defined as “an
accident.”45 “Accident” is not defined in most liability policies, but a large
body of case law has addressed it—and often not consistently even within
the same state.46 In Auto-Owners Insurance Co. v. Harvey,47 the Indiana
Supreme Court ruled that intentionally pushing someone who then fell into
the water and drowned could still be considered an “accident,” and thus an
“occurrence,” if the fact finder determined that the insured did not intend
the injury.48 In contrast, the Seventh Circuit previously held, based on its
interpretation of Indiana law, that even absent intent to kill, there was no
“occurrence” when the policyholder shot the victim on purpose.49 Perhaps
these cases could be distinguished factually, but more relevantly, they help
demonstrate that injuries caused by an intentional act often create coverage
uncertainty based on the facts, policy language, choice of law, and judicial
45
ISO, HOMEOWNERS 3-SPECIAL FORM (HO 00 03 05 11) (2011) [hereinafter ISO HOMEOWNERS
3 FORM]. ISO policy numbers identify the type of form. Here, HO stands for homeowners, 03 is the
designation for the “special form” policy which, despite its name, is the standard homeowners policy
utilized in the United States, and 05 11 is the approximate date the policy was implemented (May
2011). A recent U.S. Government Accountability Office report summarizes the various ISO HO forms,
noting that the ISO HO 03 is “the most commonly written policy.” U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE, GAO 14-179, HOMEOWNERS INSURANCE: MULTIPLE CHALLENGES MAKE EXPANDING
PRIVATE COVERAGE DIFFICULT 4 tbl.1 (2014).
State Farm, the largest homeowners insurer in the United States, defines occurrence as “an
accident, including exposure to conditions, which results in: a. ‘bodily injury’ or b. ‘property damage.’”
STATE FARM FIRE & CAS. CO., HOMEOWNERS POLICY 2 (1992), available at
http://docs.nv.gov/doi/documents/home_policies/StateFarmForms/FP-7955.pdf [hereinafter STATE
FARM HOMEOWNERS POLICY]; see also NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, 2012 TOP 25 GROUPS AND
COMPANIES BY COUNTRYWIDE PREMIUM 2 (2013), available at http://www.naic.org/documents/resear
ch_top_25_market_share_pc.pdf (noting that State Farm has a 20.74% market share). Thanks to the
efforts of insurance regulators in Nevada and Missouri, personal lines policy forms from the major
insurers in their states can be found on their websites. Policy Forms Used by the 10 Largest
Homeowners’ Insurance Groups in Nevada, NEV. DIV. INS., http://doi.nv.gov/Consumers/Homeowners
-Insurance/Policy-Forms/ (last visited Apr. 15, 2014); Homeowners Policies, MO. DEP’T INS.,
http://insurance.mo.gov/consumers/home/homeowners_policies.php (last visited Apr. 15, 2014). As
Professor Daniel Schwarcz notes, insurance contracts are typically not available to a policyholder until
after the policy is purchased—and sometimes months later. See Daniel Schwarcz, Reevaluating
Standard Insurance Policies, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 1263, 1319–23 (2011) (outlining the difficulties in
obtaining pre-purchase access to policy forms). Professor Schwarcz’s research and his advocacy
before the National Association of Insurance Commissioners contributed to these initial regulatory
efforts.
46
“The difficulty in precisely defining the scope of coverage in liability policies providing
coverage for ‘accidents’ is not a problem of recent vintage. . . . [F]ew insurance policy terms have
‘provoked more controversy in litigation than the word ‘accident.’” Koikos v. Travelers Ins. Co., 849
So. 2d 263, 266 (Fla. 2003) (alterations in original) (quoting State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. CTC Dev.
Corp., 720 So. 2d 1072, 1075 (Fla. 1998)).
47
842 N.E.2d 1279 (Ind. 2006).
48
Id. at 1285. The insured’s involuntary manslaughter conviction only demonstrated the intent to
cause an unlawful touching and not necessarily the desire to cause injury. Id. at 1287.
49
See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Morgan, 64 Fed. App’x 537, 540 (7th Cir. 2003) (“Her
volitional acts of aiming the gun at Morgan and pulling the trigger were not accidents, and therefore are
not covered under the Policy. That she may not have intended to kill Morgan . . . is irrelevant.”).
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interpretation. This uncertainty is one reason why relying on liability
insurance to cover intentional shootings is problematic, even absent an
intent to kill or cause serious harm.50
Almost all liability insurance policies have intentional harm
exclusions.51 However, there is more variation in this language than there
is for “occurrence.” These differences carry important consequences for
the coverage of allegedly intentional acts still considered “accidents” and,
correspondingly, whether an “intentional” injury or death caused by a
firearm will be covered—particularly for negligence claims against an
insured arising out of a co-insured’s intentional conduct.
To illustrate how minor differences in wording can lead to very
different results, suppose Otto and Sophie are the parents of fourteen-yearold Freddy. Otto has a gun collection but is careless in locking it up and
often leaves the firearms loaded. One day Freddy has a friend over and
they get into a bad argument. In a fury, Freddy takes a pistol from the
unlocked cabinet, yells “This is how serious I am!,” and shoots near his
friend’s head, intending to fire a “warning shot” (or so he later claims).
Unfortunately his aim is off and he hits and seriously wounds his now
former friend. The friend and his parents sue Freddy, Otto, and Sophie,
who promptly notify their homeowners insurer, requesting coverage for the
claim.
Now, consider the likelihood that the family would be covered for this
claim—which, if the injury is serious and the damages high, may also
determine whether the shooting victim receives any financial
compensation. Otto, Sophie, and Freddy would all be considered insureds
under both the most current ISO homeowners policy form, the ISO HO 00
03 05 11, and a State Farm policy.52
ISO’s “Expected or Intended Injury” exclusion states:
Personal Liability . . . do[es] not apply to the following:
1. Expected Or Intended Injury
“Bodily injury” or “property damage” which is expected or
intended by an “insured”, even if the resulting “bodily
injury” or “property damage”:

50
For a detailed review of case law in this area, see RINA CARMEL ET AL., ABA SECTION OF
LITIG., CAUGHT IN THE CROSS FIRE: IMPACT OF COVERAGE ISSUES, DEFENSE ISSUES, AND FIREARM
LEGISLATION FOR GUN CLAIMS, (2014), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/ad
ministrative/litigation/materials/2014_inscle_materials/written_materials/p5_1_caught_in_the_crossfire
.authcheckdam.pdf.
51
Baker & Farrish, supra note 14, at 299.
52
The definition of “insured” includes the named insured (on the policy) and relatives of the
insured who reside in the household. ISO HOMEOWNERS 3 FORM, supra note 45, at 1; STATE FARM
HOMEOWNERS POLICY, supra note 45, at 1.
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a. Is of a different kind, quality or degree than initially
expected or intended; or
b. Is sustained by a different person, entity or property
than initially expected or intended.
However this Exclusion . . . does not apply to “bodily
injury” or “property damage” resulting from the use of
reasonable force by an “insured” to protect persons or
property.53
State Farm’s intentional harm exclusion is less detailed:
Coverage L (Personal Liability) and Coverage M
(Medical Payments to Others) do not apply to:
a. bodily injury or property damage:
(1) which is either expected or intended by the
insured; or
(2) which is the result of willful and malicious acts of
the insured . . . .54
In evaluating coverage for Freddie, an insurer utilizing ISO’s
“expected or intended injury” exclusion would have a fair (though not
conclusive) argument to successfully deny coverage for the shooting, even
assuming Freddie was able to prove that he did not intend to hit and
seriously injure his friend. That exclusion applies not only to bodily injury
specifically intended, but also injury that “is of a different kind, quality or
degree than initially expected or intended.”55 This broad exclusion would
allow the insurer to argue that the admittedly intentional act of shooting a
loaded gun in close proximity to an individual during a heated argument
triggers this exclusion, even though the bodily injury actually caused was
of a “different kind, quality or degree” than anticipated.56 In contrast,
assuming the policyholders successfully demonstrated Freddie only meant
to scare his friend, State Farm would have a much more difficult time
53
ISO HOMEOWNERS 3 FORM, supra note 45, at 19. Terms appearing within quotations are
defined within the form. Id. at 1–2.
54
STATE FARM HOMEOWNERS POLICY, supra note 45, at 15–16. The “willful and malicious acts
of the insured” exclusionary clause could, of course, defeat coverage as well. However, judicial
interpretations on how and when it applies are mixed, and its applicability is uncertain, especially in
cases involving minors, as well as actions that were not blatantly malicious. See, e.g., Norris v. State
Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 16 S.W.3d 242, 244–46 (Ark. 2000) (finding exclusion was not applicable due
to ambiguity); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Schwich, 749 N.W.2d 108, 113 (Minn. Ct. App. 2008)
(ruling that exclusion applied, but noting “[c]ases involving malicious acts are usually ‘factually more
extreme,’: the actor knows or should have known that harm was substantially certain to result, but acts
with a deliberate and calculated indifference to the risk of injury”).
55
ISO HOMEOWNERS 3 FORM, supra note 45, at 19.
56
The policyholder could, however, assert that no harm or injury of any type was intended.

1280

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:1265

demonstrating that the resulting harm was expected or intended.
There is a further step. If Otto and Sophie are sued under a negligence
theory, say negligent supervision, the coverage results would also be
different. Under the ISO form, if Freddie is deemed to have intended the
harm, as defined in the policy, then there is no coverage for any insured,
since the exclusion uses the term “an insured.”57 Intentional harm
“expected or intended” by one insured negates coverage for all insureds,
regardless of whether their actions were only negligent.58 In contrast, the
State Farm policy only excludes bodily injury “which is either expected or
intended by the insured.”59 So, even if Freddie is not covered for his
actions due to the intentional harm exclusion, the State Farm policy would
still respond to negligence claims against his parents and possibly provide
compensation to the victim.60
Unfortunately, at least for policyholders and third party claimants, the
more limited State Farm exclusion goes against the trend in homeowners
policies of expanding the intentional harm exclusion, as we see with the
ISO form.61 Among major carriers, Travelers, Nationwide, and The
Hartford follow the ISO exclusion.62 Allstate excludes “bodily injury or
57

ISO HOMEOWNERS 3 FORM, supra note 45, at 19 (emphasis added).
Id.
59
STATE FARM HOMEOWNERS POLICY, supra note 45, at 16 (emphasis added).
60
The importance of the “an insured’ (or any insured) versus “the insured” language is well
recognized in case law. See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Davis, 430 F. Supp. 2d 1112, 1134 (D. Haw.
2006) (holding that Allstate need not indemnify or defend any other person other than “the insured”);
Minkler v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 232 P.3d 612, 614 (Cal. 2010) (recognizing the differing opinions
on “an insured” versus “the insured” with regards to a severability-of-interests provision); Catholic
Diocese of Dodge City v. Raymer, 840 P.2d 456, 461–62 (Kan. 1992) (reviewing opinions concerning
severability-of-interest provisions and concluding that exclusions are only applied to “the insured”);
Co-operative Ins. Cos. v. Woodward, 45 A.3d 89, 94 (Vt. 2012) (discussing the language and policy
differences between “an insured” and “the insured”); see also Hazel Glenn Beh, Tort Liability for
Intentional Acts of Family Members: Will Your Insurer Stand by You?, 68 TENN. L. REV. 1, 33–36
(2000) (discussing distinctions between “an,” “any,” and “the” insured).
61
The last ISO homeowners form to contain the more limited exclusion similar to that used in
State Farm was its HO 00 03 04 91, which was implemented in April 1991. In three subsequent
forms—HO 00 03 10 00 (October 2000), HO 00 03 05 01 (May 2001), and HO 00 03 05 11 (May
2011)—ISO has utilized the intentional harm exclusion cited above. The American Association of
Insurance Services (“AAIS”), an ISO competitor that also develops policy forms, contains an
international harm exclusion in its homeowners policy that is at least as expansive as the ISO’s. AAIS
HOMEOWNERS PROGRAM (policy form on file with author). Though a discussion of this issue is
outside the scope of this Article, the expansion of the intentional harm exclusion mirrors other changes
in personal lines policies that are circumscribing coverage in some important areas, but usually not
noticed or commented on by even diligent readers of their own policies or other commentators.
Schwarcz, supra note 45, at 1303–08.
62
See TRAVELERS, HOMEOWNERS SPECIAL FORM HO-3 (06-06), at 19 (2006) [hereinafter
TRAVELERS HOMEOWNERS POLICY], available at http://docs.nv.gov/doi/documents/home_policies/Tra
velersForms/Travelers_HO-3.pdf (employing the term “an ‘insured’”); NATIONWIDE, HOMEOWNERS 3
FORM (HO 3 (01 00)), at 21 (2000), available at http://insurance.mo.gov/consumers/home/documents/
HO3-0100-01.pdf (same); THE HARTFORD, HOMEOWNERS 3 SPECIAL FORM (HO 00 03 10 00), at 17
(2000), available at http://docs.nv.gov/doi/documents/home_policies/HartfordForms/Hartford_HO_00
58
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property damage intended by, or which may reasonably be expected to
result from the intentional or criminal acts or omissions of, any insured
person,” and contains the ISO “different kind or degree than intended”
language.63 USAA and Liberty Mutual utilize language very similar to
Allstate’s, and the “foreseeable result” and “reasonably expected”
additions in their policies expand the intentional harm exclusion and
provide additional grounds for the insurer to deny coverage.64 Zurich,
through its Farmers Insurance subsidiary, goes even further.65
This brief discussion of intentional harm exclusions shows that
standard personal lines liability policies: (1) exclude intentionally caused
_03_10_00.pdf (same). Travelers, Nationwide, and The Hartford hold approximately 4.39%, 3.75%,
and 1.42% of the homeowners market in the United States, respectively. NAT’L ASS’N OF INS.
COMM’RS, supra note 45, at 2.
63
ALLSTATE INDEMNITY CO., STANDARD HOMEOWNERS POLICY AP783, at 16,
available at http://docs.nv.gov/doi/documents/home_policies/AllStateForms/AP783.pdf. Allstate has
approximately 9.12% of the homeowners market in the United States. NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS,
supra note 45, at 2.
64
See USAA, HOMEOWNERS 3R(02) SPECIAL FORM (07-08), at 24 (2008) [hereinafter USAA
HOMEOWNERS POLICY], available at http://docs.nv.gov/doi/documents/home_policies/USAAForms/H
O-3R(02)(07-08).pdf (using “reasonably expected”); LIBERTY MUTUAL, SAFECO HOMEOWNERS
POLICY (HOMC-7030/EP 1/09), at 14 (2009), [hereinafter LIBERTY MUTUAL HOMEOWNERS POLICY],
available at http://docs.nv.gov/doi/documents/home_policies/LibertyMutualForms/HOM-7030.pdf
(using “foreseeable result”). The market share for USAA and Liberty Mutual is 4.91% and 5.89%,
respectively. NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, supra note 45, at 2.
65
See ZURICH, FARMERS NEXT GENERATION HOMEOWNERS POLICY NEVADA
(56-5544 1ST ED. 7-06), at 38 (2006) [hereinafter ZURICH HOMEOWNERS POLICY], available at
http://docs.nv.gov/doi/documents/home_policies/ZurichForms/56-5544-1st.pdf (listing such coverage
exclusions as mistaken beliefs, intentional acts, and failure to act). Zurich has 6.22% of the market,
largely through Farmers. NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, supra note 45, at 2. The exclusion is so
broad it is worth setting out:
We do not cover bodily injury, property damage or personal injury which is caused
by, arises out of, or is the result of an intentional act by or at the direction of any
insured. By way of example this includes but is not limited to any intentional act or
intentional failure to act by any insured, whether a criminal act or otherwise, where
resulting injury or damage would be objectively expected to a high degree of
likelihood, even if not subjectively intended or expected. This exclusion applies
even if:
a. any insured mistakenly believes he or she has the right to engage in certain
conduct;
b. the injury or damage is sustained by persons or property not intended or expected
by any insured;
c. the injury or damage is different or greater or of a different quality than that
intended or expected;
d. any insured did not understand that injury or damage may result; or
e. any insured knew the intentional act or failure to act was a violation of any penal
law, whether or not an insured is actually charged with or convicted of a crime.
ZURICH HOMEOWNERS POLICY, supra, at 38.
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harm (often even if the harm that occurred was “of a different kind, quality
or degree” than the harm initially expected, if any); and (2) are likely to
exclude derivative negligence claims against other insureds whose policies
otherwise might provide a legal defense to the policyholder and a source of
compensation to the victims. Based on 2012 market data compiled by the
National Association of Insurance Commissioners (“NAIC”), the eight
insurers mentioned above write approximately 56% of the nation’s
homeowners insurance market.66 State Farm, the largest personal lines
insurer in the country, possesses 20.7% of the homeowners insurance
market.67
2. The Uncertainty of Self-Defense Provisions
The self-defense exception to the intentional harm exclusion is one of
the few current areas where liability insurance could fulfill its hoped-for
role in financially protecting policyholders and compensating victims shot
in alleged acts of self-defense.68 This coverage is limited, though, for
several reasons.69
First, the exception is not found in all homeowners policies. Five of
the ten policies discussed in the previous section contain a self-defense
66
NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, supra note 45, at 2. Presumably, many of the insurers who
write the rest of the homeowners market also utilize ISO’s intentional harm exclusion, or a similarly
broad one.
67
Id.
68
An “exception” to an exclusion brings back some of the coverage the exclusion would
otherwise eliminate. For example, an insured who intentionally caused harm in a legitimate act of selfdefense would not be excluded from coverage due to the intentional harm exclusion. ISO’s exception
states: “However this Exclusion E.1 [Intentional Harm] does not apply to ‘bodily injury’ or ‘property
damage’ resulting from the use of reasonable force by an ‘insured’ to protect persons or property.” ISO
HOMEOWNERS 3 FORM, supra note 45, at 19.
69
The existence of statutory or common law self-defense laws as a defense to criminal
prosecution does not dictate insurance coverage, which is governed (in part) by the language of the
policy and the applicability of its contractual intentional harm exclusion. See State Farm Fire & Cas.
Co. v. Marshall, 554 So. 2d 504, 505 (Fla. 1989) (“The intent underlying an act of self-defense where
the defender intends to harm the attacker is identical to that underlying an assault. In each, the actor
intends to inflict harm on the other. . . . The difference between the two lies in the motive or purpose
governing the act; the motive for one is worthy, that for the other is not. Nevertheless, such acts of
self-defense are undeniably intentional and have been held to be embraced within intentional act
exclusions by a majority of courts.”); see also Coop. Fire Ins. Ass’n of Vt. v. Bizon, 693 A.2d 722, 728
(Vt. 1997) (holding that “intent” is a complex term and does not necessarily include harmful acts).
Some courts have disagreed with this analysis and ruled that intentional harm caused by a lawful use of
self-defense can constitute an “accident” and not trigger the intentional injury exclusion despite the
absence of a self-defense exception in the policy. See, e.g., Vt. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Walukiewicz, 966 A.2d
672, 682 (Conn. 2009) (“Accordingly we conclude that the intentional injury exclusion does not
preclude coverage for injuries resulting from legitimate acts of self-defense because those injuries were
not expected or intended by the insured.”). For a discussion of how courts interpret self-defense claims
in the face of intentional harm exclusions, see generally John Dwight Ingram, The Expected or
Intended Exclusion in Liability Insurance: What About Self-Defense?, 42 CREIGHTON L. REV. 123
(2009).
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70

exception. Second, standard homeowners policies do not cover any costs
associated with defending against criminal charges.71 Third, even when
present in the policy, the exception’s applicability will often be uncertain
as it will depend upon the policy language, the facts of the shooting, and
state law on the use of self-defense in criminal cases, as well as the claim
adjuster’s assessment of how these issues apply.72 As with varying judicial
definitions of “accident,”73 these ambiguities will often leave the
policyholder, insurer, and victim uncertain about the scope of insurance
coverage.
Perhaps because of these limitations, several insurers offer specialized
liability products for gun owners. This market has attracted increased
attention from gun owners and the media.74 The NRA endorses an
insurance program through broker Lockton Affinity, which administers a
number of gun-related insurance products, including self-defense coverage,
excess personal liability insurance, and coverage for gun shops and gun
shows.75 The self-defense endorsement to Lockton’s excess personal
liability insurance provides coverage for “‘bodily injury’ or ‘property
damage’ caused by the use of a ‘legally possessed firearm’ by the
Individual Insured Member while engaged in an ‘act of self-defense.’”76
Self-defense is defined as actions authorized by state law.77 There are two
70
The ISO, AAIS, Travelers, USAA, and Liberty Mutual policy forms contain self-defense
exceptions. ISO HOMEOWNERS 3 FORM, supra note 45, at 19; AAIS, supra note 61; TRAVELERS
HOMEOWNERS POLICY, supra note 62, at 19; USAA HOMEOWNERS POLICY, supra note 64, at 24;
LIBERTY MUTUAL HOMEOWNERS POLICY, supra note 64, at 14. The State Farm, Nationwide, The
Hartford, Allstate, and Zurich, policy forms do not.
71
E.g., USAA HOMEOWNERS POLICY, supra note 64, at 24.
72
See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Justice, 493 S.E.2d 532, 535–36 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that
the facts of the underlying case were sufficient for a jury to find that the insured triggered his policy’s
self-defense exception, despite the insurer’s argument that the facts actually supported a finding of
“mutual combat”).
73
See supra notes 46–50 and accompanying text.
74
See Stephanie K. Jones, Interest in Personal Gun Liability Insurance Protection Increasing,
INS. J. (Apr. 11, 2013), http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2013/04/11/288010.htm
(discussing the increased availability of personal gun liability insurance); Jay MacDonald, Gun Owners
Seek Out Self Defense Insurance, BANKRATE (Feb. 1, 2013), http://www.bankrate.com/finance/insuran
ce/gun-owners-seek-self-defense-insurance.aspx (discussing advocates’ increased calls for gun liability
insurance).
75
Insurance for NRA Members, LOCKTON AFFINITY, http://www.locktonrisk.com/nrains/member
s.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2014). A Lloyd’s syndicate underwrites the coverage and provides the
actual insurance. LLOYD’S, PERSONAL FIREARMS LIABILITY INSURANCE: POLICY FORM (2013),
[hereinafter LLOYD’S LIABILITY INSURANCE FORM], available at http://www.locktonrisk.com/nrains/fo
rms/Self-Defense_Certificate_of_Insurance.pdf. The policy states it is excess to any other liability
policy providing coverage. Id. § I.A.
76
LLOYD’S LIABILITY INSURANCE FORM, supra note 75, amend. § VII.A.
77
See id. amend. § X.P (“‘Act of self-defense’ shall mean the act of defending one’s person, or
other persons who may be threatened, or one’s property by the actual or threatened use of a ‘legally
possessed firearm’ as may be authorized by an applicable local, state or federal laws of the state or
jurisdiction within which the ‘bodily injury’ or ‘property damage’ occurs. ‘Act of self-defense’
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separate aspects of coverage: (1) the standard insuring agreement for civil
actions, which includes a duty to defend; and (2) reimbursement for
criminal defense costs up to the policy limits, but only if either the charges
are dropped or the insured is acquitted “due to an ‘act of self-defense.’”78
The insurance application allows the policyholder to select policy limits
from $100,000 to $1,000,000.79
III. INSURING INTENTIONAL HARM AND CRIMINAL ACTS
If standard liability policies would only rarely respond to wrongful
deaths and injuries caused by firearms, where does this leave us? States
could either encourage or require liability insurers to cover what they
currently exclude under their standard policies: bodily injury intentionally
caused by firearms. This approach suggests four scenarios: (1) insurers
voluntarily offer coverage and gun owners are required to obtain it;
(2) insurers are required to offer this coverage in specific policies (e.g.,
homeowners policies) and gun owners are required to obtain it; (3) insurers
are required to offer coverage, but purchase is optional for gun owners;
(4) insurers voluntarily offer coverage and purchase is optional for gun
owners. Each scenario presents problems; options (3) and (4), in which
gun owners are not required to obtain insurance, are functionally
comparable due to moral hazard and adverse selection issues discussed
below.
A. Insurers Voluntarily Covering Intentional Harm
Market-based solutions are usually preferable to mandating insurance
coverage, particularly if many insurers and potential policyholders would
be hostile to such coverage requirements. However, there appears to be
little interest among insurers to expand liability coverage for gun-related
injuries outside of certain specialty insurance products offered to gun
owners and gun clubs, such as enhanced self-defense coverage.80 This is
not surprising. As noted above, homeowners policies already cover some
negligence claims involving the use of firearms, though it is increasingly
unlikely that a policy would cover a negligence claim if another insured
under the policy intentionally harmed the claimant (as determined by state
insurance coverage law, not tort law). Many policies, though certainly not
includes the rendering of emergency assistance solely at the request of a uniformed law enforcement
officer.”).
78
Id. amend. §§ VII.A–B, XIII.
79
The yearly premiums range from $165.00 ($100,000 limit) to $600.00 ($1,000,000 limit).
Reimbursement for “Criminal Defense Expenses” require limits of $500,000 or $1,000,000. NRA SelfDefense Insurance, LOCKTON AFFINITY, http://www.locktonrisk.com/nrains/defense.htm (last visited
Apr. 15, 2014).
80
See supra text accompanying notes 75–79.
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all, also contain a self-defense exception to the intentional harm
exclusion.81 Insurance coverage for criminal prosecutions is rare, at least
for personal lines policies.82 If there is an increase in coverage demands
for gun-related injuries, especially if accompanied by court decisions
favorable to policyholders, we are more likely to see explicit exclusions for
gun related injuries rather than increased coverage.83
Financial or actuarial risk is another obstacle for insurers in
underwriting coverage for firearm-related claims arising out of willful acts.
Insurers need sufficient data to estimate claim frequency and a range of
damage awards to establish adequate rates.84 This type of coverage would
be new and insurers would not have the quantity and quality of information
they typically rely on in underwriting liability policies. Further, insurers’
actuarial ability to underwrite this coverage accurately using risk-based
rate structures does not guarantee that they would be allowed to charge the
premiums desired. Rate regulation remains an essential component of
insurance regulation in many states, particularly in personal lines.85 There
is a sufficient history of regulatory rate suppression to create legitimate
concerns that insurers would not be allowed to charge sufficient premiums
to cover losses,86 especially when access to firearms involves both
constitutional rights and fervent advocacy by gun-rights organizations.
Though regulatory rate suppression for firearm liability insurance may
make it cheaper and therefore more palatable for gun owners, it would
reduce or defeat insurers’ ability to price for risk, one of the primary
objectives of mandating liability insurance.
While these concerns are real, they need not be significant obstacles.
81

See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
See Tom Baker, Liability Insurance at the Tort-Crime Boundary, in FAULT LINES: TORT LAW
AS CULTURAL PRACTICE 66, 70 (David M. Engel & Michael McCann eds., 2009) (“[A]lthough liability
insurance contracts provide broad defense and indemnity coverage for tort proceedings and tort
damages, they typically do not provide defense coverage for criminal proceedings, and, to my
knowledge, they never provide any coverage for criminal fines or penalties.”).
83
See Missing the Target, Gun Insurance Proposals Overlook Important Realities of the Risks,
VIEWPOINT, Winter 2013, at 3, 7 (“In any event, if liability insurers reconsider their exposure to gun
violence in any fundamental sense, they are more likely to reduce that exposure, not expand it.”).
84
See Baker & Farrish, supra note 14, at 298 (“The core analytical task of an insurance enterprise
is identifying future losses, . . . estimating their frequency and magnitude, . . . and then deciding how
much to charge to which classes of people in return for this protection.”).
85
See, e.g., FED. INS. OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, HOW TO MODERNIZE AND IMPROVE
THE SYSTEM OF INSURANCE REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES 54–55 (2013).
86
See ABRAHAM, supra note 19, at 129 (“[I]nsurers are always concerned about the prospect that
their rates will be regulated in a manner that denies them what they regard as a fair profit.”); Steven W.
Pottier & Robert C. Witt, On the Demand for Liability Insurance: An Insurance Economics
Perspective, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1681, 1700 (1994) (“[Insurance] affordability concerns have led to rate
suppression in many states and, as a consequence, have led to availability problems.”); see also State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. New Jersey, 590 A.2d 191 (N.J. 1991) (noting that a provision of the Fair
Automobile Insurance Reform Act that prohibited insurers from directly passing surcharges and
assessments on to policyholders was not an unconstitutional taking).
82
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First, insurers would have access to a large amount of public information
collected by public safety agencies and other groups concerning incidents
of firearm use, the type of firearms used, whether criminal charges were
filed, and some approximation of the injuries caused.87 And while insurers
may have little experience in adjusting liability claims arising out of
intentional shootings, the causes of action and types of damages available
to claimants would be very familiar (e.g., medical treatment, lost income,
pain and suffering, loss of consortium). Second, insurers could use
standard risk mitigation practices to limit their liability, for example,
through the use of a sublimit, capping insurer liability at a lower limit than
available in the policy as a whole, or by narrowing the scope of liability
itself through additional exclusions.88 Third, insurers often do write new
products in the absence of significant underwriting data, if they perceive
there is an economic incentive to do so.89
Unfortunately, there seems to be little profit in the enterprise, even if
insurers do surmount these hurdles. Given that Second Amendment and
gun rights issues are volatile areas for many individuals and organizations,
providing insurance coverage for the product could interject these insurers
into a political and social debate they likely would want to avoid—costing
them policyholders in otherwise profitable areas, such as standard
homeowners and automobile insurance. Finally, even if these issues were
successfully addressed (or willing to be risked), the likely underwriting
profit would be small90 and arguably not worth the time to develop the
product, obtain regulatory approval,91 educate insurance producers, litigate
the inevitable challenges, and face the reputational risks it could entail.

87
This assumption can be tested through a much more thorough review of the information
available and an evaluation of what underwriting assumptions could be accurately drawn from this
data. At present, critics argue that firearms injury data is not comprehensive or is otherwise flawed.
See supra note 25. Moreover, there are likely political and perhaps legal problems with expanding
research in this area and allowing private insurers access to some of the data.
88
See 12 COUCH ON INSURANCE § 180:15 (3d ed. 2005) (“Insurers frequently specify a maximum
amount that is reasonable under the policy . . . .”).
89
Tom Baker, The Shifting Terrain of Risk and Uncertainty on the Liability Insurance Field, 60
DEPAUL L. REV. 521, 529–31 (2011).
90
Commentators have offered premium estimates falling within the range of $20 to $57. See
Stephen G. Gilles & Nelson Lund, Mandatory Liability Insurance for Firearm Owners: Design
Choices and Second Amendment Limits, 14 ENGAGE 18, 23 (2013) (estimating a baseline premium of
$20 per year for the average firearm owner); Tom Harvey, Gun Insurance Would Not Be Expensive,
GUN INS. BLOG (Jan. 23, 2013), http://www.guninsuranceblog.com/gun-insurance-would-not-beexpensive/ (estimating an average premium of $57.15 per year, per gun).
91
Depending on the state, insurers may need to obtain regulatory approval from the state
insurance department when introducing a new coverage. State Insurance Regulation: History, Purpose
and Structure, NAIC, http://www.naic.org/documents/consumer_state_reg_brief.pdf (last visited Apr.
15, 2014).
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B. Optional Purchase of Insurance Coverage
Giving gun owners the option to purchase liability insurance that
would cover intentional harm could reduce the furor that compulsory
coverage would provoke, but it creates severe adverse selection problems.
Few gun owners would likely purchase an endorsement that would cover
future acts that, under criminal law, could be classified as homicides or
assaults with a deadly weapon—or perhaps more important, insurers would
not want to sell to those individuals who selectively believed they might
need this coverage during the policy period. This problem would exist
regardless of whether the insurer was required to offer the product or just
authorized and encouraged to do so.92 Insurers could also face another
traditional adverse selection issue,93 where the riskiest homeowners/gun
owners could constitute a growing majority in an underwriting pool. Their
(likely) greater claim frequency would drive the premiums upwards and
further discourage its purchase by low-risk insureds, which could cause a
higher loss ratio, creating even higher premiums and driving even more
low-risk insureds out of the market.
C. Mandatory Offer and Purchase
Compulsory coverage for injuries caused by illegal use of firearms
addresses some of these problems. Insurers would presumably not be a
significant focus of gun owner anger if the law required them to offer the
coverage—or at least not after public furor died down. The moral hazard
and adverse selection issues associated with optional purchase of this
coverage would be significantly lessened since all gun owners would be
required to purchase this coverage.94
What if a state required liability insurers to cover intentional
shootings? Leaving aside for a moment the wisdom of such legislation
(and Second Amendment issues), states would likely have the legal
authority to mandate this coverage, at least absent express federal
legislation preempting such laws. States have broad powers to regulate
insurance, an area of traditional state concern.95 The McCarran-Ferguson
92
There is an argument for gun owners to purchase enhanced liability insurance to cover selfdefense claims, since not every insurer provides a self-defense exception in intentional harm exclusions
and even for those that do, insurers may still dispute coverage on the facts of specific cases. See Gilles
& Lund, supra note 90, at 19 (“Given the vagaries of self-defense law and the uncertainty over how a
jury will evaluate a colorable claim of self-defense, some gun owners could benefit from enhanced selfdefense liability coverage . . . .”); supra notes 70–73 and accompanying text.
93
See 1 COUCH ON INSURANCE, supra note 88, § 1:3 (defining adverse selections as “the
statistical phenomenon of people with higher than average risk seeking insurance more often than
people of average or below average risk”).
94
For a discussion of some specific concerns relating to moral hazard, see infra Part III.C.1.
95
Id. § 2:2.
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Act reaffirms this right, and establishes that state laws related to the
“business of insurance” will not be preempted by implication.97 Some
states would also need to amend or repeal statutory prohibitions against
insurance coverage for intentional acts or harm, which would not be an
obstacle to state legislatures who wish to mandate this coverage for gun
owners.98
Opponents have raised many objections to requiring this coverage. I
do not believe most of them are sustainable and addressed some of the
various problems above. The following two subsections focus on two
major objections: (1) insurance cannot cover intentional harm; and
(2) insurers would not offer insurance covering intentional gun violence.
1. Insurance Does Not Cover Illegal Acts
As expected, insurers oppose providing coverage for intentional harm
caused by a firearm.99 Dr. Robert Hartwig, President of the Insurance
Information Institute, stated: “Insurers don’t cover illegal acts, ever,
period.”100
Yet, insurers often do. A prime example is coverage for driving while
intoxicated. Personal lines automobile policies do not exclude bodily
injury or property damage when the policyholder is driving under the
influence of alcohol or drugs in violation of law.101 These policies do
exclude intentional harm, but there is no exclusion for criminal acts as
there are in several of the homeowners policies mentioned earlier.102 The
96

15 U.S.C. §§ 1012–1015 (2012).
Id. § 1012(a)–(b); see Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 427–28 (2003) (“[T]he
business of insurance shall be recognized as a subject of state regulation, which will be good against
preemption by federal legislation unless that legislation specifically relates to the business of
insurance.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); ESAB Grp., Inc. v. Zurich Ins. PLC,
685 F.3d 376, 380 (4th Cir. 2012) (observing that the McCarran-Ferguson Act authorizes “‘reverse
preemption’ of generally applicable federal statutes by state laws enacted for the purpose of regulating
the business of insurance”); Life Partners, Inc. v. Morrison, 484 F.3d 284, 291–95 (4th Cir. 2007)
(describing Congress’s purpose in enacting the McCarran-Ferguson Act).
98
See, e.g., CAL. INS. CODE § 533 (West 2013) (“An insurer is not liable for a loss caused by the
willful act of the insured; but he is not exonerated by the negligence of the insured, or of the insured’s
agents or others.”); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 175, § 47 (West 2013) (“[N]o company may insure
any person against legal liability for causing injury . . . by his deliberate or intentional crime or
wrongdoing . . . .”).
99
See Cavanaugh, supra note 4 (“[T]he industry knows one thing: illegal acts cannot be
insured.”).
100
Jones, supra note 74 (internal quotation marks omitted).
101
See, e.g., Baker, supra note 82, at 74 n.10 (“[T]he overwhelmingly compensatory purpose of
compulsory automobile liability insurance has prevented automobile insurance companies from putting
drunk driving exclusions in their policies.”); Avi Perry, Restructuring Insurance Coverage for Drunk
Drivers, 4 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 427, 431 (2010) (“[N]o Connecticut automobile insurance policy
reviewed . . . contained an exclusion for injuries or damages arising as a result of drunk driving.”).
102
Perry, supra note 101, at 431; see supra notes 63–65 and accompanying text. The intentional
harm exclusion in ISO auto policies is limited. See ISO, PERSONAL AUTO POLICY FORM
97
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likely reason for this coverage is that legislators and regulators would not
allow insurers to add a driving while intoxicated (DWI) or criminal act
exclusion because of the numerous deaths and injuries that occur each year
by impaired drivers.103 Exclusions for intoxicated driving would eliminate
a major source of financial contribution to victims harmed by this
behavior, thus defeating a primary purpose of liability insurance.104 We
also know that the minimum liability limits required under state motor
vehicle financial responsibility laws are not sufficient to compensate for
serious bodily injuries.105
Professional liability policies, such as Errors & Omissions and
Directors & Officers coverages, exclude intentionally dishonest, criminal,
and similar acts, but typically the insurer may only deny coverage on this
ground if the fraud is actually proven.106 Until then, the policy requires the
insurer to defend the policyholder or reimburse defense costs.107 For
example, a typical Directors & Officers policy excludes:
[A]ny Claim . . . alleging, based upon, arising out of, or
attributable to any deliberately fraudulent or deliberately
criminal act, error or omission. However, this exclusion shall
not apply unless and until there is a final adjudication against

(PP 00 01 01 05), at 3 (2003), available at http://www.sba.muohio.edu/adelmasw/classes/Policies/0109%20PersonalAutoPolicyPP00010105.pdf (“We do not provide Liability Coverage for any
‘insured’ . . . [w]ho intentionally causes ‘bodily injury’ or ‘property damage.’”).
103
See NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., ALCOHOL IMPAIRED DRIVING 1 (2012),
available at http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/Pubs/811606.pdf (noting that in 2010 over 10,000 people
were killed in alcohol-impaired motor vehicle accidents, accounting for approximately one-third of the
total motor vehicle traffic death toll).
104
See Baker, supra note 82, at 74 n.10 (“[T]he overwhelmingly compensatory purpose of
compulsory automobile liability insurance has prevented automobile insurance companies from putting
drunk driving exclusion in their policies.”); Perry, supra note 101, at 432 (“If a drunk driving exclusion
were permitted, many tort victims would be either undercompensated or wholly uncompensated for
their injuries since drivers typically have shallower pockets than do insurers.”). Critics of this regime
that allows for DWI-related coverage may argue “that the gap between the criminal and civil
consequences of illegal conduct should be narrow, if not nonexistent.” Id. at 427. Professor Gary
Schwartz notes a potential shared theoretical justification in tort law and liability insurance: “[T]he
many scholars who unqualifiedly assert that liability insurance is inconsistent with fairness theories of
tort law are guilty of ignoring . . . the possibility that compensatory justice is the theory that tort law
has in mind—a theory that renders liability insurance not only acceptable but commendable.” Gary T.
Schwartz, The Ethics and the Economics of Tort Liability Insurance, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 313, 335
(1990).
105
Most states require auto liability insurance in the $20,000 to $25,000 range (per person, which
doubles the total amount), though some states go as high as $50,000 in minimum liability limits. Stateby-State Minimum Coverage Requirements, supra note 20.
106
9A COUCH ON INSURANCE, supra note 88, § 131:16; 14 id. § 201:59.
107
14 Id. § 201:59.
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any Insured as to such conduct.

On a practical level, this requirement is often tantamount to coverage,
since these cases are rarely tried to conclusion and judicial resolution of
any fraud allegations is unlikely.109 Further, insurance coverage for
defense costs can bring in substantial financial resources to a case and
serve as one source of compensation for reaching settlement.110 These
exclusions are underwritten and priced with the knowledge that intentional
fraud allegations alone will not defeat insurance coverage.111
Similar coverage is available even for allegations of criminal acts
causing significant physical and emotional injury, such as physical and
sexual abuse. As an illustration, Hanover Insurance offers professional
liability insurance for human service agencies that includes optional
endorsements covering civil liability for “Physical and Sexual Abuse
Coverage” (to protect the agency) and “Innocent Party Defense Coverage”
(to protect agency employees).112 A separate endorsement reimburses the
agency for defense costs it pays to employees charged with criminal acts,
but only if the charges are dismissed or the employee acquitted.113
First party property insurance typically provides coverage to
individuals and entities who are “innocent co-insureds.” For example,
mortgage lenders do not lose their coverage (often as an “additional
insured”) on properties in which they have maintained a security interest
even when a borrower/insured intentionally damages or destroys the

108
ACE ADVANTAGE, MANAGEMENT PROTECTION POLICY (PF-18880), at 5 (2005),
available at http://www.acegroup.com/us-en/assets/ace-advantage-management-protection-policy-forpublic-companies.pdf.
109
Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, How the Merits Matter: Directors’ and Officers’ Insurance and
Securities Settlements, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 755, 776–77 (2009).
110
See id. at 760–61, n.19 (noting that Directors and Officers liability policies “typically cover
amounts paid in settlements as well as defense costs”).
111
Errors & Omissions policies contain similar provisions. See, e.g., BEAZLEY INS. CO.,
LAWYERS PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY INSURANCE POLICY (F00020), at 5 (2008), available at
https://www.beazley.com/forms_and_resources_search_page.html?business=164&type=1565 (select
“Lawyers” from the first drop-down menu, “Wordings/policies” from the second drop-down menu,
then follow “Lawyers_PL_Ins_Policy.pdf”) (“The coverage under this Policy does not apply to
Damages or Claims Expenses in connection with or resulting from any Claim . . . arising out of or
resulting from any criminal, dishonest, fraudulent or malicious act, error or omission of any Insured;
however, this Policy shall apply to Claims Expenses incurred in defending any such Claim alleging the
foregoing until such time as there is a final adjudication, judgment, binding arbitration decision or
conviction against the Insured, or admission by the Insured, establishing such criminal, dishonest,
fraudulent or malicious conduct, or a plea of nolo contendere or no contest regarding such alleged
conduct, at which time the Insured shall reimburse the Underwriter for all Claims Expenses incurred
defending the Claim and the Underwriter shall have no further liability for Claims Expenses.”).
112
HANOVER INS. GRP., PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY, GENERAL LIABILITY, AND ABUSE &
MOLESTATION COVERAGE 6 (2008), available at http://www.hanover.com/linec/docs/115-1066.pdf.
113
See id. at 4 (stating that reimbursement for criminal defense fees is limited to $25,000).
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property (e.g., through arson).
Numerous courts have held that innocent insureds, such as spouses, are
entitled to coverage even if their co-insured intentionally set fire to a home
or other property, regardless of whether the insurance policy itself excludes
intentional acts caused by “any” or “an” insured.115 These cases are often
based on policy language that is inconsistent with statutory requirements
for standard fire policies, which apply to first party property coverages in
both homeowner and commercial policies.116
The existence and
enforcement of these requirements protects individuals, especially victims
of domestic abuse, whose co-insured (e.g., a spouse or partner)
intentionally commits arson, perhaps as retaliation for acrimonious divorce
or separation proceedings.117
So insurers, either by public policy or by choice and market demands,
often insure illegal and intentional acts, despite the moral hazards inherent
in doing so. This is not surprising given the multiple roles that liability
insurance plays, such as protecting policyholder assets, compensating
injured parties, and promoting safer practices—whether in driving a
vehicle, designing and manufacturing products, or providing services.
While moral hazard concerns for insuring intentionally caused harm
are legitimate,118 in practice it is unlikely that insurance coverage for
intentional shootings would encourage additional gun violence even by
reducing the financial costs of such actions. First, policyholders already
face substantial criminal penalties far more severe than any exacted
through civil litigation. Second, there are significant normative, personal,
and psychological barriers to intentionally shooting someone (particularly
a family member) that are presumably a far greater deterrent for most
114
See ISO HOMEOWNERS 3 FORM, supra note 45, at 15 (“If we deny your claim, that denial will
not apply to a valid claim of the mortgagee . . . .”).
115
See, e.g., Nangle v. Farmers Ins. Co., 73 P.3d 1252, 1257–58 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003) (discussing
the possible recovery of an innocent co-insured if she did not know that her husband had set the fire);
Trinity Universal Ins. Co. v. Kirsling, 73 P.3d 102, 106–07 (Idaho 2003) (holding that a fire insurance
policy could not provide less coverage to an innocent co-insured than that which would have been
afforded under her standard policy); Sager v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 680 N.W.2d 8, 14 (Iowa
2004) (discussing the unenforceability of intentional loss provision in fire insurance policy).
116
See Century-Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Garcia, 246 P.3d 621, 625–27 (Cal. 2011) (surveying cases
holding that fire policies excluding coverage for an innocent co-insured were unenforceable because
they undermined statutorily mandated coverage).
117
VAUGHAN & VAUGHAN, supra note 41, at 466; Melody S. Mosley, Arson and Innocent CoInsureds: Homeowners Coverage Analysis, PROP. CASUALTY 360 (Nov. 6, 2012), http://www.property
casualty360.com/2012/11/06/arson-and-innocent-co-insureds-homeowners-coverage.
118
“Somewhat loosely speaking, moral hazard is the tendency of insurance to diminish an
insured’s incentives to take care that would reduce the risk being insured against.” Tom Baker & Peter
Siegelman, The Law and Economics of Liability Insurance: A Theoretical and Empirical Review, in
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF TORTS 169, 169 n.3 (Jennifer Arlen ed., 2013); see also
Rick Swedloff, Uncompensated Torts, 28 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 721, 762–66 (2012) (discussing moral
hazard).
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people than the risk of being sued.
These deterrents would remain and
when they are not sufficient to prevent an intentional shooting, it is
difficult to imagine that civil liability for harm caused by an intentional
shooting provides any real additional deterrence to an individual’s decision
to shoot another person.120 Further, an important goal of mandating this
coverage is to leverage insurers’ loss prevention abilities and, through riskbased pricing, encourage gun owners to store firearms in a safer manner—
thus reducing the use of guns in suicides, domestic violence, and other
situations where such use was not premeditated.
Insurers have long addressed moral hazard concerns through “contract
design,” which provides policyholders financial incentives (or penalties) to
minimize insured losses, and also thereby reducing the financial
consequences of insuring these risks for insurers.121 These tools include
deductibles, policy limits, and experience ratings, as well as providing sublimits on particular risks and narrowly drawing specific coverages or
exclusions. These practices are designed to give policyholders a financial
stake in managing their insured risks and would play a similar role here.
2. Insurers Might Refuse to Write the Coverage
If insurers would have minimal economic incentive to voluntarily offer
this coverage even assuming sufficient rate flexibility, then mandatory
coverage is the alternative. However, while states likely could require
insurers to offer coverage for intentional harm caused by a gun as a
condition of writing a specific coverage line in their state, they cannot
require an insurer to write in that line. For example, an auto insurer cannot
be required to also write homeowners insurance, or a commercial lines
insurer to write personal lines policies.
For states, the most logical solution is tying this coverage to
homeowners (and renters) insurance, a business line that insurers would be
very reluctant to exit because of a new coverage requirement.122 While this
119
Of course, an individual who intends to kill or intentionally risks killing someone as part of a
criminal endeavor has already bypassed these deterrents.
120
Commentators and courts have expressed similar skepticism that insurance coverage for
intentional torts would measurably increase the likelihood of occurrence. See, e.g., Christopher C.
French, Debunking the Myth that Insurance Coverage Is Not Available or Allowed for Intentional Torts
or Damages, 8 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 65, 71 (2012) (discussing a Wyoming Supreme Court decision that
expressed an inability to locate any studies showing that insurance for punitive damages would make
misconduct more probable); Erik S. Knutsen, Fortuity Clauses in Liability Insurance: Solving
Coverage Dilemmas for Intentional and Criminal Conduct, 37 QUEEN’S L.J. 73, 109 (2011) (“Most
insureds do not consider loss of insurance coverage while acting in a manner that could be deemed to
be intentional or criminal”); Swedloff, supra note 118, at 763–64 (noting that the fear of moral hazard
is likely exaggerated).
121
Baker & Siegelman, supra note 118, at 177–79; Swedloff, supra note 118, at 765.
122
This assumes that insurers can charge adequate rates and contain losses through policy limits
so that a coverage mandate does not significantly alter existing profitability (or in some cases, loss)

2014]

LIABILITY INSURANCE AND GUN VIOLENCE

1293

would be unpopular with insurers, coverage mandates are both a historic
and contemporary feature of insurance regulation. For example, starting in
1887, New York and many other states mandated a specific insurance
contract for fire coverage in property policies;123 these provisions still
remain in force today and their coverage requirements consistently
upheld.124 States generally require auto insurers to offer uninsured and
underinsured motorists coverage with specified limits125 and provide
minimum coverage requirements in general.126 Workers’ compensation
policies must cover all benefits authorized by state law (without policy
limits), and disability and life insurance policies must comply with state
nonforfeiture laws.127
Conceptually, then, mandating that a homeowners policy include
coverage for intentional harm caused by a firearm is consistent with a
state’s traditional regulatory prerogatives. Exiting a state’s homeowners
market in the face of such a mandate would be a drastic step for personal
lines insurers and likely an excessive response to this type of mandate,
particularly if the allowed rates are adequate, the risks are controllable (i.e.,

margins. For brevity, I include renters insurance within the ambit of homeowners insurance, though
the take-up rate for renters insurance is much lower than for homeowners insurance, in part because
mortgage lenders require homeowners coverage. Sarah Coffey, Renters Insurance for Former
Homeowners, BANKRATE (July 10, 2012), http://www.bankrate.com/finance/insurance/rentersinsurance-former-homeowners.aspx (“Not everyone is convinced that renters insurance is affordable or
worth the investment. About 97 percent of homeowners have insurance coverage, but only about 47
percent of renters are insured . . . .”).
123
See Scott G. Johnson, The Suit Limitation Provision and the Equitable Tolling Doctrine, 30
TORT & INS. L.J. 1015, 1016 n.4 (1995) (“The standard fire policy was first enacted into a statute in
New York in 1887 and is often called the New York Standard Fire Insurance Policy.”).
124
N.Y. INS. LAW § 3404 (McKinney 2013); Quaker Hills, LLC v. Pac. Indem. Co., 728 F.3d
171, 180, 184 (2d Cir. 2013) (upholding the enforceability of the mandatory New York Standard Form
fire insurance unless an insurer deviates for terms that are more favorable).
125
E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38a-336(a)(1)–(2) (2013). States could also require personal lines
auto insurers to cover wrongful acts committed with firearms. While auto policies cover far fewer acts
of gun violence than a homeowners policy, auto liability insurance is already mandated and has an
extensive enforcement regime in place. If coverage could be expanded beyond the traditional limits of
auto liability insurance (i.e., bodily injury and property damage arising out of the use of an auto), then
requiring both home and auto policies to cover intentional gun violence would expand the overall
insurance pool, reduce premiums, and provide more compensation to victims.
126
E.g., id. § 38a-335(a).
127
See id. § 31-345(a), (b)(2) (requiring workers’ compensation policies to be approved by the
Insurance Commissioner and requiring the Workers’ Compensation Commission to annually determine
a sufficient amount to meet expenses incurred); id. § 17b-611(a) (allowing the Commissioner of Social
Services to provide a subsidized nongroup health insurance coverage for disabled persons); id. § 38a439(a) (“[N]o policy of life insurance, except as stated in subsection (i) of this section, shall be
delivered or issued for delivery in this state unless it contains in substance the following provisions, or
corresponding provisions which in the opinion of the commissioner are at least as favorable to the
defaulting or surrendering policyholder as are the minimum requirements hereinafter specified and are
substantially in compliance with subsection (h) of this section . . . .”).
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appropriate limits exist), and other states enact similar laws that would
make state market withdrawals increasingly difficult.
Nor is drafting the language especially difficult. This coverage could
be provided by current homeowners policies or through a separate
endorsement. For instance, the most current ISO form discussed above,
the HO 00 03 05 11, could be adapted through a modification of the basic
insuring agreement to expand the concept of “occurrence” (accident) and
an additional exception to the intentional harm exclusion. For example,
this policy could be amended by defining “firearm” and adding the
following underlined language:
Section II – Liability Coverages
A. Coverage E – Personal Liability
If a claim is made or a suit is brought against an “insured”
for damages because of “bodily injury” or “property
damage” caused by an “occurrence” or because of “bodily
injury” caused by a “firearm”, to which this coverage
applies, we will: . . . .
Personal Liability . . . does not apply to the following:
1. Expected or Intended Injury
“Bodily injury” or “property damage” which is expected or
intended by an “insured”, even if the resulting “bodily
injury” or “property damage”:
a. Is of a different kind, quality or degree than initially
expected or intended; or
b. Is sustained by a different person, entity or property
than initially expected or intended.
However this Exclusion does not apply to:
(1) “bodily injury” or “property damage” resulting from
the use of reasonable force by an “insured” to protect
persons or property, or
(2) “bodily injury” resulting from an insured’s use of a
“firearm.”
128
In addition to limiting the maximum amount of indemnity an insurer might owe, a state could
restrict—or authorize insurers to limit—the definition of allowable intentional harm (e.g., no coverage
for insureds hired to harm the victim, or a premeditated assault with the intention to murder). The type
and number of coverage limitations also depends on the desired balance between various public goals.
For example, the more victim compensation and leveraging of the insurance industry’s risk mitigation
features that occur, then the more restrictions a state would put on insurers’ use of sub-limits, selfinsured retentions, and limitations on what type of “intentional” harm could still be excluded.
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IV. WHO WOULD BUY THIS INSURANCE?
Assume that the following are true: (1) insurers are required to offer,
and gun owners must purchase, some form of liability insurance for
intentional harm through the use of a gun; (2) the rates charged by insurers
are actuarially valid and not suppressed (or raised) through regulation;
(3) the proposal captures the three primary objectives of liability
insurance—protecting policyholder assets, compensating victims, and
encouraging risk mitigation strategies through underwriting; (4) the
required coverage and associated limitations (e.g., sub-limits) adequately
reduce the moral hazard of insuring wrongful acts; and (5) the public
benefits of mandating coverage for illegal or wrongful acts of gun violence
are sufficient to justify its use as an appropriate regulatory tool.
Even if all these conditions exist and there is sufficient political
support to enact these coverage mandates, one major obstacle remains.
Those most likely to shoot and injure others are not likely to be insured or
otherwise have homeowners or renters insurance; nor would civil or
criminal sanctions associated with violating a statutory requirement to
purchase liability insurance deter individuals who already face far more
severe penalties if convicted of an illegal shooting. The level of gun
violence in our country is appalling, but unless we can address this issue,
mandating liability insurance will not noticeably reduce it.
These problems should give pause to advocates and state legislators
who wish to reduce gun violence through leveraging the traditional
advantages of liability insurance. However, liability insurance offers too
many potential advantages to be discarded without much greater
consideration. These benefits include compensating victims, financially
protecting policyholders, and insurers’ ability to analyze, underwrite, and
mitigate loss. The private insurance market has limitations, but it can also
be innovative and ready to take (reasonably) measurable risks. Insurers
have developed insurance products for many perils previously thought
uninsurable because of traditional moral hazard concerns,129 significant
exposure issues,130 or simply because the risk was historically ignored for
129
For example, some professional liability insurance policies cover sexual abuse claims. See
supra note 112 and accompanying text.
130
Insurance coverage for acts of terrorism is widely available, though only after the 9/11 attacks
when the federal government created a reinsurance backstop covering a portion of loss associated with
an announced act of terrorism. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-297, 116 Stat.
2322. This program is supported by most insurers, reinsurers, agents and brokers, and commercial
policyholders, and demonstrates that public and private participation in some insurance programs can
be successful. While acts of terrorism strike locally, they are directed against the nation as a whole and
a national response seems appropriate. This Article focuses almost solely on state regulatory solutions;
additional thought and research should be given to whether the federal government has a role in
encouraging a private insurance market for mandatory firearm liability insurance covering wrongful
acts.
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coverage purposes.
Further, the use of a private regulatory tool such as insurance might not
only be more effective and less costly than a government program or
mandate, but it might significantly temper the philosophical or political
concerns many gun owners have about (further) governmental intrusion on
Second Amendment rights.132 A coverage mandate could financially
motivate insurers to conduct or support additional research on reducing
gun violence, as there would be a better alignment between their policy
coverage obligations and the harm caused through firearms. These private
market economic incentives could also avoid the current limitations on
government-funded research in this area and the divisive political debates
surrounding them.133
There are other ways to think about gun violence, insurance, and
government policy. Two are briefly discussed here, simply as a starting
point, to illustrate several alternatives in conceptualizing how insurance, or
similar compensation/protection programs, could be used to address and
reduce gun violence in our country.
A. Creating Compensation Funds Through Surcharges
States that mandate liability insurance for gun owners could require a
portion of the insurance premium to go to a compensation fund for victims
shot by an uninsured person. While there are precedents for this type of
subsidization,134 there are fairness issues in requiring individuals (as
131
For example, while the “absolute pollution exclusion” is utilized in most commercial general
liability (“CGL”) policies, companies can obtain a variety of specialized liability policies and
endorsements covering environmental risks. See ANN WAGNER, AM. L. INST., THE IMPACT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW ON REAL ESTATE AND BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS: BROWNFIELDS AND BEYOND,
CURRENT INSURANCE POLICIES FOR INSURING AGAINST ENVIRONMENTAL RISK (2013), available at
SU035 ALI-CLE 1685 (Westlaw). Damage to a company’s reputation and the retention of a public
relations firm to “restore” the reputation is often included in professional liability policies, particularly
those covering emerging cyber and social media risks. See Baker & Swedloff, supra note 8, at 1422
(“[I]nsurers provide loss prevention services for other reasons as well (such as marketing, public
relations, and buyer demand) . . . .”).
132
A private regulatory tool may reduce, but it certainly will not eliminate, gun owners’ concerns.
Mandating insurance means there must be an enforcement mechanism and accessible records, whether
under public or private control, correlating gun ownership with the required insurance. See Mocsary,
supra note 9, at 1258 (noting that “[a]n effect of mandatory insurance would be to provide insurance
companies with a substantial amount of information about insureds” and that the vast amount of data
insurers would have raises the question by gun owners about “whether, and to what extent, the firearmspecific information will be protected”).
133
See supra note 25.
134
Insurers are required to contribute to state guaranty funds that are activated when an insurer
becomes insolvent and has insufficient assets to pay claims, and many licensed professionals, such as
lawyers and brokers, may be required to contribute to funds that compensate individuals harmed by
other professionals in that field. See generally Kent M. Forney, Insurer Insolvencies and Guaranty
Associations, 43 DRAKE L. REV. 813 (1995) (providing a discussion of the insurance insolvency
problem, a history of state liquidation acts, and developments in state guaranty associations). The

2014]

LIABILITY INSURANCE AND GUN VIOLENCE

1297

opposed to commercial enterprises) who are fully compliant with a law to
pay for the consequences of those who are not. In addition, unlike other
compensation schemes, the percentage of those purchasing firearm liability
insurance and paying into the fund is likely to be less than the number of
uninsured tortfeasors responsible for the majority of shootings. The cost of
this insurance would increase significantly, with the majority of the claims
paid likely going to victims of shooters who did not obtain the mandatory
insurance.135
B. Play or Pay
A more promising alternative would be to mandate liability insurance
but allow gun purchasers the option to either purchase the insurance or to
pay a surcharge (perhaps more expensive than the cost of the insurance),
with the proceeds of the surcharge going to a compensation fund for gun
violence victims. This option could allow the three major roles of liability
insurance to operate by: (1) providing compensation for victims of gun
violence; (2) creating incentives for liability insurers to further develop and
utilize loss prevention mechanisms that could reduce gun violence; and (3)
protecting gun owners who purchased insurance instead of paying the
surcharge. Creating this option may also diminish the opposition to an
insurance mandate, though the political furor surrounding the Affordable
Care Act’s individual mandate136 suggests otherwise. However, it only
partially addresses the compensation function of insurance, as it does not
guarantee that the funds collected through the surcharge would be
sufficient to compensate the victims of gun violence.
We can also review the assumption, noted here and more definitively
stated elsewhere,137 that a liability insurance mandate would be both
National Conference of Insurance Guaranty Funds (property casualty) and the National Organization of
Life and Health Insurance Guaranty Associations provide extensive information on state guaranty laws.
NAT’L CONF. INS. GUARANTY FUNDS, http://ncigf.org; http://www.nolhga.com (last visited Apr. 15,
2014); NAT’L ORG. LIFE & HEALTH INS. GUARANTY ASS’NS, https://www.nolhga.com (last visited
Apr. 15, 2014).
135
A more direct approach would be to tax all gun sales at the federal or national level, rather than
surcharging liability policies or mandating insurance coverage with or without coverage for intentional
harm. While this plan could provide more funds for victim compensation, research, and public health
strategies aimed at reducing gun violence, it would not utilize the insurance industry’s ability to rate,
price risk, and enhance gun safety and ownership. Nor would it provide specific insurance coverage
for gun owners. This proposal is not new and brings a separate set of legal and public policy concerns
that will not be addressed in this Article.
136
The mandate establishes a “shared responsibility payment” whereby a taxpayer who “fails to
meet the requirement [to “maintain minimum essential coverage”] must pay a “penalty with respect to
such failures.” 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(a)(b)(1) (2012).
137
See Mocsary, supra note 9, at 1258 (“[T]here is little doubt that criminals will not
insure . . . .”); id. at 1260 (“Rightly or wrongly, Americans have more ingrained reasons to defy
insurance mandates that they believe may lead to confiscation [of firearms]. . . . In other words, there
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widely ignored by individuals who legally own guns and irrelevant to the
majority of tortfeasors who are responsible for much of the gun violence.
However, some gun owners would purchase mandatory insurance because
it was the law, regardless of personal objections. Some gun right
advocates, such as the NRA, and gun owners do perceive (correctly) the
gaps in existing insurance coverage since there is a market for enhanced
liability coverage for accidental and self-defense shootings.138 Thus, there
is a subset of people that would obey an insurance mandate, we just do not
know the size of that subset and whether it would constitute a sufficiently
large risk pool to truly engage the private insurance market and trigger its
ability to actuarially assess the causes and consequences of gun violence,
underwrite liability coverage for wrongful acts committed with a firearm,
and reduce at least some of the potential for gun violence through riskbased premiums.
V. CONCLUSION
Advocates for mandatory liability insurance rightly point out its
potential advantages. These include not only policyholder protection and
victim compensation, but also leveraging risk mitigation functions that
insurance schemes can provide. Importantly, these benefits would also
extend beyond the traditional recipients (i.e., policyholders and victims) to
include individuals typically not part of a liability scheme, such as
domestic partners and family members. Delaying access to firearms and
restricting their use to particular individuals could diminish the use of
firearms in suicide attempts and domestic disputes. In particular, since
suicides account for over sixty percent of gun violence, measures that
could reduce gun access to those contemplating this act could be a
significant public policy achievement.
Homeowners policies may now cover the relatively small number of
accidental firearm injuries and deaths, but insurers are reducing even this
coverage through expanded intentional harm exclusions. Requiring
insurance coverage for wrongful acts committed with a firearm would
significantly expand the insurance benefits available to reduce and
compensate for gun violence. There is sufficient regulatory authority and
insurance precedent for regulators to mandate such coverage, which would
better align insurers’ risk mitigation strategies with actual losses under
their policies. The more difficult issue is the presumed disconnect between
gun violence and the users’ willingness to purchase liability insurance even
if required. This conundrum should not end the debate.
are reasons to believe that many otherwise-law-abiding firearm owners would respond to an insurance
mandate the same way that they have responded to mandatory gun registration: by defying it.”).
138
See supra text accompanying notes 75–77.
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We do not have enough information either to reject or champion the
use of insurance as a tool to significantly reduce gun violence. We do
know, however, that the potential benefits of liability insurance could be
considerable and that the industry can, when motivated, assess and
underwrite risks that previously were considered uninsurable. For now,
analysis and debate should be supported, rather than shutting—or
shouting—down advocates on any side of these issues.

